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RECENT CASES
influential role in the development of his children, especially male children,
has been acknowledged and promoted by the courts.4" The father's import-
ance in the child's life, therefore, has not been relegated to an inconsequen-
tial position. Rather, the courts encourage custodial arrangements where
the child will be with the father.
Recognizing that the judge must "[o]ften select the better of two poor"
homes41 for the child, the Missouri Court of Appeals has remained flexible
and has attempted to achieve the "least detrimental solution '42 for the child.
The Powers decision is illustrative of the judicial attempt to reconcile the
sometimes competing goals of stability of relationship and association with
both parents. This balancing approach is a welcome and commendable
effort to achieve the result most beneficial to the child.
DEBORAH DANIELS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-HUSBAND'S "VESTED"
INTEREST IN RETIREMENT PLAN IS
DIVISIBLE AS MARITAL PROPERTY
In Re Marriage of Powers'
The trial court rendered judgment on June 17, 1974, and both parties
appealed various aspects of the court's decree. One issue on appeal was
whether the husband's interest in a profit-sharing retirement plan was
mother was adulterous. See J. Lewis & G. Tockman, The Status of Missouri Law in the
Troubled Area of Child Custody, 27 Mo. L. REV. 406, 419-32 (1962). See also Annot., 23
A.L.R.3d 6 (1969). However, some courts have adopted a realistic approach and
found that "all things never are exactly equal." Garbee v. Tyree, 400 S.W.2d 193, 199
(Spr. Mo. App. 1966) cited with approval in M-L- v. M-R-, 407 S.W.2d 600, 603
(Spr. Mo. App. 1966). Accord, Bolten v. Bolten, 507 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1974). The constitutionality of the presumption has been litigated in other jurisdic-
tions. E.g., State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973).
40. The court states in Blair v. Blair, 505 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Mo. App., D. Spr.
1974) that courts recognize "'the fact that male children growing out of tender years
need and will be benefited by the father's influence and guidance." Accord, Baer v.
Baer, 51 S.W.2d 873, 879 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932).
41. H-B-- v. R-B-, 449 S.W.2d 890, 893 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
42. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT, supra note 13, at 553-54. For judicial
implementation of this philosophy, see Johnson v. Johnson, 526 S.W.2d 33 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1975). Accord, Flanders v. Flanders, 241 Iowa 159, 40 N.W.2d 468
(1950). In M-L- v. M-R-, 407 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Spr. Mo. App. 1968) the court
said, "[P]erplexing problems of custody must be resolved not by applying academic
rules or by mouthing pious platitudes but rather by determining, insofar as is
humanly possible, what will best serve and promote the child's welfare." Cited in I- v.
I-, 482 S.W.2d 523, 528 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
1. 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
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marital property under the new Missouri Dissolution of Marriage Act.2 The
husband claimed that his interest in the plan was not definite enough to
constitute property, and therefore could not be subject to division.' In
support of this contention, the husband noted that he was not entitled to
immediate benefits from the funds until he retired or left the employment of
the company. The St. Louis District of the Missouri Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's holding that the husband's interest in the plan was
marital property.
4
Under the Missouri Dissolution of Marriage Act, the court is permitted
to divide "marital property."' Prior to the enactment of the new law, the
court lacked this authority, although an award of alimony in gross6 served as
a substitute for property division. The definition of marital property under
the new act is similar to the concept of community property in community
property jurisdictions-i.e., property earned during the marriage by either
spouse is considered the property of the marital community. 7 Several of the
exceptions to marital property enumerated in the Missouri law correspond
to items which would be considered property acquired by lucrative title
under community property theory, and hence, excludable from the prop-
erty of the marital community.8 Under community property theory, an
employee spouse's interest in a retirement plan may be considered property
of the marital community. 9 By analogy, such an interest may be considered
marital property under the Missouri law.
2. §§ 452.300-.415, RSMo 1973 Supp.
3. 527 S.W.2d at 957. As authority for this position, the husband cited Robbins
v. Robbins, 463 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1971).
4. 527 S.W.2d at 957.
5. Section 452.330(3), RSMo 1973 Supp., provides:
For purposes of sections 452.300 to 452.415 only, "marital property" means all
property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the
marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or
descent;
(3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
6. § 452.080, RSMo 1939. It was through such an award that the wife sought
an interest in her husband's interest in a retirement plan in Robbins. 463 S.W.2d at
879.
7. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 24,
127-28 (2d ed. 1971).
8. "Property acquired by lucrative title is that acquired through gift, succes-
sion, inheritance, or the like. It has its basis in pure donation on the part of the
donor." Id. at 128.
9. Id. at 147-48. The interest in the fund would be considered community
property regardless of whether the employee spouse contributes anything directly to
the plan. The benefit to him is still viewed as consideration paid for his services, and
therefore earned by the marital community. Id. In some cases, however, a pension
interest may be considered a gift to the employee, and, therefore, not community
property. See, e.g., Diagre v. Diagre, 228 La. 682, 83 So. 2d 900 (1955).
(Vol. 42
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The Powers court failed to recognize the applicability of community
property principles to the new act and did not look to cases in community
property jurisdictions to support its holding. Instead, the court merely
distinguished a Missouri case decided prior to the new act.
One spouse's interest in a retirement plan of the other is one of the more
confusing items to be considered in a division of property. The courts'
resolution of the problem is particularly important, because the right to
participate in a pension plan is often the family's most valuable asset.' 0 The
major issues which confront a court dealing with a retirement plan are: (1)
does the employee spouse's interest or right in the plan constitute "prop-
erty"?; and (2) if the non-employee spouse is entitled to some portion of this
"property", how should this interest be satisfied?
Although a court may recognize that an interest in a retirement plan has
potential value," it may be unwilling to divide such an interest unless it has
achieved the status of property. The point at which the interest in a plan
ceases to be a mere expectancy and becomes judicially recognizable as
property is normally designated as "vesting."'12 Thus, if a court does not
consider an employee's interest in the plan to be vested, it may not subject
that interest to division as property.'
3
If only vested pension rights are subject to division, the crucial question
is when such rights should be considered as vested. The strictest view holds
that vesting coincides with the time at which payments under the plan
actually begin, but this theory has been rejected by those jurisdictions which
have confronted the vesting problem with respect to property division. 14
Instead, the courts have focused on the facts of each case, and have
examined the conditions which the employee spouse must meet before he is
entitled to benefits under the plan.
Most community property states hold that "vesting occurs upon the
completion of the minimum service required by the [plan] for retirement."'15
10. Blackburn, Economic Aspects of Pension Plans, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 89
(1962).
11. Typically, an employee may acquire three rights under a pension plan: (1)
Policy rights, i.e., in the corpus of the fund; (2) Income rights, i.e.,'rights to specific
periodic payments; (3) Proceeds rights, i.e., rights to designate a death beneficiary.
Note, 19 S.W.L.J. 370, 371-72 (1965).
12. Comment, Community Property-Deferred Compensation: Disposition of Milit-
ary Retired Pay Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 50 WASH. L. REv. 505, 515 (1975);
Hughes, Community Property Aspects of Profit Sharing and Pension Plans in Texas-
Recent Developments and Proposed Guidelines for the Future, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 860, 871
(1966); Kent, Pension Funds and Problems Under California Community Property Laws, 2
STAN. L. REV. 447, 463 (1950).
13. Robbins v. Robbins, 463 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1971); Tucker v. Tucker, 121
N.J. Super. 539, 298 A.2d 91 (1972); Davis v. Davis, 495 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1973).
14. Comment, supra note 12, at 515. This view allows relative ease in resolving
the question of vesting, but such ease is offset by its harsh disadvantage to the
non-employee spouse.
15. Id. at 516. E.g., Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (the
court held that husband's interest in retirement fund was divisible property where he
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The court in Powers employed similar reasoning, noting that the husband's
interest in his employer's contributions to the plan were not subject to
divestment, because he had participated in the plan for the required five
years.' 6 Where the employee spouse does not yet have a right to receive
payment, either because he has not yet served the minimum required service
period or because the plan provides for no such minimum period and the
spouse has not yet retired, many courts have refused to consider the interest
as vested. 7
In Robbins v. Robbins,'" a case decided under the old Missouri divorce
law, the Missouri Supreme Court denied a wife's request that her husband's
interest in a pension plan be valued among his assets for purposes of
determining how much gross alimony she should receive. Because the
husband's right to receive payment was subject to his remaining employed
until he was eligible for retirement, the court considered the interest too
speculative to be the object of an alimony award.19 Because the husband did
have a right to his own contributions to the retirement plan, the court
considered his interest to be subject to inclusion in the valuation for alimony.
If a case factually similar to Robbins arises under the Missouri Dissolution of
Marriage Act, the husband's contributions to the plan should be designated
as marital property.20
The potential inequity of a rule which holds that there is no vesting
prior to eligibility for payment is that it deprives the non-employee spouse of
the possibility to share in the deferred compensation for services which were
rendered during the marriage. 21 Some courts have sought to ameliorate the
harshness of this rule by allowing a division of the interest in a pension plan
even though the employee spouse was not eligible to receive payments. The
Texas Court of Appeals held the interest in a military pension to be divisible,
even though the husband had not yet served the twenty years required for
retirement, because his present enlistment term extended beyond the
required period.22 The Washington Court of Appeals granted division of
had served beyond the required twenty years in the Marine Corps to be eligible for
retirement benefits, although he had not yet retired and the benefits were subject to
forfeiture for dishonorable discharge or death). The husband's interest in the
retirement plan is analogous to a vested remainder subject to divestment for a
condition subsequent. See T. BERGIN & F. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND
AND FUTURE INTERESTS 74 (1966).
16. 527 S.W.2d at 957.
17. Cases cited note 13 supra.
18. 463 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1971).
19. Id at 880.
20. Note, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 347 (1973). The husband's contributions are made
from his earnings, which are undeniably marital property.
21. Comment, 50 WASH. L. REv., supra note 12, at 519. Note, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
347 (1973). For example, a wife who is married to a serviceman for eighteen years,
and then gets divorced before her husband has served the required twenty year
period, receives nothing for her eighteen years' participation in the marital commun-
ity which acquired that interest in the pension fund.
22. Miser v. Miser, 475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
[Vol. 42
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benefits under a retirement plan on the theory that, although the husband
did not yet have a vested right to payment, he did have a vested right in the
system which could not be altered to his detriment." The Supreme Court of
Washington has recently held that "- . . the proper rule is that the court
must consider all the circumstances and evaluate the probability that the
party who had a contingent right to a pension will eventually enjoy that
pension."
24
Arguably, vesting should not be a requirement for divisibility of an
interest in a pension plan. It has been noted that the courts have recognized a
community interest in other assets which are of potential value only, but
which were developed by the expenditure of community time and effort.ts
In Waters v. Waters26 the California Court of Appeals held that the wife had a
half interest in a contingent fee which her husband, an attorney, expected to
receive from a client whose case was on appeal at the time of the divorce.
Although the appeal made the receipt of the fee uncertain, the court noted
that the greater percentage of it had been earned while the marital commun-
ity was in existence. The court fashioned its decree so that the wife would
receive her portion only if the husband actually received the fee.
27
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in applying a statute for division of
property which is somewhat similar to Missouri's,2 has apparently aban-
doned the requirement of vesting. In Stern v. Stern29 the court noted that the
New Jersey law makes no reference to vesting as a prerequisite for a division
of property, but requires only that the property shall have been "acquired"
during marriage 30 However, focusing upon the term "acquired" does not
really circumvent the issue of vesting. If the court does not consider an
23. DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971).
24. Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364,-, 534 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1975). Factors
which the court should consider include: length of time remaining before eligibility
matures, likelihood that employee spouse might reasonably decide to accept another
job and abandon his pension rights, and marital community's investment in the
pension system. Id at 1358. Such a rule has an advantage in giving the court the
discretion to make awards to spouses who would otherwise receive nothing for their
membership in the marital community during a time when pension interests, albeit
not rights, were accrued. However, it appears to be a difficult rule to apply, and the
lack of judicial uniformity it could produce can be viewed as a counterbalancing
inequity.
25. Note, 24 HASTINGS L.J. supra note 21 at 354.
26. 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946).
27. Id. at 270, 170 P.2d at 498.
28. N.J.S. Ch. 34, § 2A-34-23 provides:
In all actions where a judgment of divorce or divorce from bed and board is
entered the court may make such award or awards to the parties, in
addition to alimony and maintenance, to effectuate an equitable distribu-
tion of property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially
acquired by them or either of them during the marriage.
29. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
30. Id. at 348,331 A.2d at 262. Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213,353 A.2d 144
(1976); accord, Pelligrino v. Pelligrino, 134 N.J. Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (1975).
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interest to be property unless it is vested, it may recognize that an interest has
been "acquired," but nevertheless decide that the interest is not property.
In a recent case, In re Marriage of Brown,3 ' the California Supreme Court
rejected the requirement of vesting with respect to divisibility of pension
rights upon divorce. Brown is particularly significant, for it overrules French
v. French,3 2 the seminal case for the doctrine that nonvested pension rights
are not subject to division. In a thorough opinion the Brown court explored
the nature of pension rights as a property interest and concluded that the
French court erred in characterizing non-vested pension rights as mere
expectancies.33 The Brown court noted that pension rights certainly consti-
tute a form of property, rather than mere expectancy, because they are
derived from the terms of the employment contract and are therefore a
chose in action.3 4 The inequitous division of community assets produced by
adherence to the French rule also influenced the Brown court's decision to
reject the requirement for vesting.3 5 There is also some indication that the
California court felt that its position as enunciated in French warranted
reevaluation because the pension rights of a spouse are now one of the most
valuable assets possessed by a marital community.36 The California Supreme
Court's willingness to reevaluate and reject its long standing requirement of
vesting may influence other jurisdictions to do likewise.
The Colorado Court of Appeals, applying a dissolution law identical to
Missouri's, 37 has adopted an entirely new approach. In In re Marriage of
Ellis,3 8 a Colorado Court of Appeals held that the husband's interest in an
army retirement plan did not constitute property, even though the husband
was already drawing payments under the plan at the time of the dissolu-
tion.39 The court decided that the interest should instead be considered in
fixing the amount of maintenance and child support, and recognized as an
"economic circumstance" of the husband in determining a just division of
assets that were deemed to be marital property.
40
31. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1975).
32. 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
33. 15 Cal. 3d at 844, 544 P.2d at 564, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 636. The court explains
that an expectancy is the interest of one who merely anticipates that he might receive
a future beneficence, e.g., the interest of an heir apparent. As such, a holder of an
expectancy has no enforceable right to his beneficence.
34. Id. at 845, 544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
35. Id. at 847, 544 P.2d at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638. In Brown the husband's
pension rights had been built up by twenty-four years of community effort. The
court could not condone permitting the husband to enjoy this asset as separate
property merely because he needed two additional years to acquire a vested right.
36. Id.
37. COLO. REV. STAT., Ch. 46, Art. 1, § 14-10-113 (1972).
38. 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. Appeals, 1975) cert. granted, Sept. 2, 1975.
39. Id. at 1350. The court found it important that the interest in Army retired
pay has no cash surrender value, cannot be attached prior to payment, and cannot be
assigned. Id. at 1349.
40. Id. at 1350. The court specifically rejects any analogy to community
property law, because Colorado is not a community property state. Id. at 1349.
[Vol. 42
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Having decided that an interest in a pension plan is divisible property,
and that the non-employee spouse should receive a portion thereof, a court
must still determine the manner in which this interest should be satisfied.
The problem is two-fold, involving the issues of how to value the interest in
the plan and how to fashion the decree dividing the interest. The court has
two options: (1) award the entire pension to the employee spouse and award
the non-employee spouse a lump sum or other marital property in lieu of
participation in the pension; or (2) award the non-employee spouse a
percentage division of the pension to be paid if, as, and when the pension
becomes payable. 41
If the lump sum method is used, the court must determine the value of
the employee spouse's interest in the pension plan as of the date of the
dissolution. One possibility is that the value of the interest is equal to the total
of the employee's actual earnings that have gone into the fund.42 Such a
valuation would be much too low, because it ignores both the employer's
contributions and the value of the employee's anticipated future benefits
under the plan. As a second approach, a court may hear the testimony of
actuaries concerning the present value of the interest in the plan based upon
the payments the plan is to yield upon retirement.41 Such actuarial testimony
is certainly problematic," and may fail to take into account such factors as
the contingencies for receipt, dollar fluctuation, and the possibility of
forfeiture. It has also been suggested that a plan's value should be consid-
ered to be what the employee spouse would be entitled to receive if his
services were terminated on the date of the divorce decree.45
Once the value of the interest in the plan is determined, the court must
then decide how to give each spouse his respective portion. Some rights
under the plan may have been acquired prior to the marriage. Conse-
quently, the value attributable to those pre-marriage years would not be
subject to division.46 For the rights acquired during the marriage, the court
may award cash or other marital property to the non-employee spouse in
Missouri attorneys should anxiously await the appellate ruling on this case, for if it is
affirmed, it will provide some authority for claiming the "marital property" is sui
generis, and not merely a species of community property.
41. DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741,-, 491 P.2d 249, 253 (1971).
42. W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 7, at 529.
43. In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wash. App. 805,538 P.2d 145 (1975) (admitting
evidence of actuarial value, although holding fairness, and not mathematical preci-
sion is the key to distribution of property); Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Wis. 2d 744, 229
N.W.2d 629 (1975); Schafer v. Schafer, 3 Wis. 2d 166, 87 N.W.2d 803 (1958).
44. Hughes, 44 TExAS L. REv., supra note 12, at 879.
45. Kent, 2 STAN. L. REV., supra note 12, at 465.
46. W. DE FUNIAK, supra note 7, at 530; Comment, 50 WASH. L. REv., supra note
12, at 524. For example, if a wife has been married for ten of the fifteen years during
which she has been employed by a company from which she is to receive retirement
benefits, then the husband's claim would be to some portion of 2/3's of the value of
the pension interest at the time of the divorce. E.g., Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660,
663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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lieu of an interest in the retirement plan.47 Such an award is potentially
inequitable, because the employee's pension rights may be subject to forfei-
ture on a condition subsequent, while the non-employee spouse's award is
not subject to such contingencies. In making a lump sum award a court
should take care not to consider the pension interest twice, once as an asset
for property division, and again as an income item to be considered in
awarding alimony.4 8 A lump sum award also presents problems if the
employee spouse lacks sufficient cash to pay the non-employee spouse for
his interest in the retirement plan and there is insufficient property to be
awarded in lieu of this interest.49
To avoid some of the problems inherent in a lump sum award, the court
may instead fashion its decree to award the non-employee spouse a propor-
tionate share of the retirement payments if, as, and when they are received
by the employee spouse.50 The court would determine what portion of the
retirement benefits were earned during the marriage, what portion, if any,
the non-employee spouse should receive, and fashion its decree to give the
non-employee spouse a proportionate share when the employee spouse
actually begins receiving payments.51
The "if, as, and when" award has several advantages. Arguably, the
judicial focus on the vesting concept in this area is merely a manifestation of
the courts' fear of giving the non-employee spouse an outright award when
there is a possibility that the employee spouse may never actually receive the
benefits of the plan. With the "if, as, and when" decree, such fears are
allayed, because the non-employee spouse will only receive the award if the
employee spouse actually realizes benefits.5 2 Under such a decree, a spouse
who was married for eighteen years could be rewarded for participation in
the marital community, even where the employee spouse was not yet eligible
to receive retirement benefits at the time of the dissolution. 53 Such a decree
would be particularly appropriate and effective if the employee had more
than one spouse during the period in which the retirement benefits were
being accrued.-'
47. Comment, 50 WASH. L. REv., supra note 12, at 534. E.g., Crossan v.
Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39, 94 P.2d 609 (1939); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash.
App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971).
48. Kronforst v. Kronforst, 21 Wis. 2d 54, 123 N.W.2d 528, 534 (1963).
49. Comment, 50 WASH. L. REV., supra note 12, at 534.
50. Hughes, 44 TEXAS L. REV., supra note 12, at 880-881.
51. Miser v. Miser, 475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (wife to receive
85/240's of retirement payments if, as, and when husband receives them); Webster v.
Webster, 442 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (wife to receive 10/24's of retirement
payments if, as, and when husband receives them); Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (wife to receive 88/308's of retirement payments if, as, and
when husband receives them). See also Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364,534 P.2d
1355 (1975); Davis v. Davis, 13 Wash. App. 812, 537 P.2d 1048 (1975).
52. Hughes, 44 TEXAS L. REV., supra note 12, at 881.
53. Note, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 347, 356 (1973).
54. I& at 347.
[Vol. 42
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Although it does have certain advantages, an "if, as, and when" award
may be inappropriate in some circumstances. If the amount-which the
non-employee spouse would actually receive is small, such that equivalent
marital property is available, the court should order the outright transfer of
property. Such a decree would avoid enforceability problems and achieve
finality when the actual receipt of retirement benefits will be many years
hence.55
In light of the complexity of issues involved in determining the divisibil-
ity of pension interests, the treatment of the problem in Powers is overly
simplistic. The court seized upon the term "vesting" as a shibboleth to solve
the problem.56 However, as has been noted earlier, vesting should not
necessarily be the sine qua non for divisibility of an interest in pension plans.
5 7
The Powers court did not actually analyze the problem with respect to the
new dissolution law, although it did allude to the law in its narrow holding.,
5 8
Instead, Robbins was merely distinguished on the fact that the husband's
interest in that case could be divested by contingencies
5 9
The court also failed to discuss the problem of valuing the interest in the
pension plan. The sparse number of facts given in the case with respect to
the plan fail to state what the interest in the plan was actually worth. The
award approved was apparently one in which the non-employee spouse was
awarded other marital property in lieu of a share in the payments under the
plan.6" The court did not discuss the merits of such an award, nor did it
indicate whether an "if, as, and when" award is an acceptable form of award.
The new Missouri Dissolution of Marriage Act presents problems for
those attorneys in Missouri who, through years of experience with the old
divorce law, have developed perspectives which must now be changed to
accommodate the theories of the new law. Focusing on Robbins, some
attorneys might have assumed that interests in pension plans were not
subject to division as property in a dissolution of marriage action. Powers
does serve to alert these attorneys to the reality that such an interest may be
considered marital property, 6' although the opinion does little to acquaint
attorneys with the new philosophy employed to arrive at such a result.
62
The Powers court could have taken the opportunity to reject the vesting
requirement, although it may have wished to defer to the Missouri Supreme
55. Comment, 50 WASH. L. REv., supra note 14, at 520.
56. 527 S.W.2d at 957.
57. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra.
58. 527 S.W.2d at 957.
59. Id.
60. 1&
61. Attorneys should heed such warning. The failure to consider pension
rights in a divorce action has cost a California attorney a $100,000 judgment in a
malpractice suit. Smith v. Lewis, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 530 P.2d 589 (1975).
62. The husband did not argue that the interest in the retirement plan should
be excepted from marital property; but rather, he argued it was not property at all.
527 S.W.2d at 957.
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